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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The signing on December 7, 1983, of the financial-relief-and-worker-role-in-management 
agreement at Eastern Air Lines marked the culmination of a four-year effort by IAM District 100 to 
respond effectively to Eastern management and to an abruptly changing environment in the airline 
industry. It was also the beginning of a new phase. 
Beset by a hostile management, the devastating effects of airline deregulation, a deep recession, and the 
general anti-union climate in the country, the leadership of IAM District 100 felt it had forged a way out of 
a vicious and debilitating cycle. The basic principles for this way out—or "model" if you will—included: 
exhaustive research on the actual conditions and operations of the company; an aggressive policy of 
taking the initiative rather than waiting to react; an insistence on reciprocal and equitable efforts and 
sacrifices; and the demand for a real augmentation of the decision-making role of workers and their union 
in the operations of the company. 
Keywords 
IAM, District 100, Eastern Airlines, negotiations, critique 
This article is available in Labor Research Review: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/lrr/vol1/iss5/6 
95 1 
ing the burden of 
;, the company can 
ssue in the Eastern 
whether the union 
e it is constrained 
ith concessions on 
ay on the offensive 
lagment practices, 
itures and sloppy 
1 likely to fall into 
ssion demands by 
Lent heralded as a 
e postponed for a 
tant union and an 
on gained in 1984 
roblems. And that 
corporate executives, 
s. It found that EAL 
md environmental 
ty to attract, develop 
250th in "long-term 
Jtern management's 
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• Randy Barber & Andrew R. Banks 
The signing on December 7, 1983, of the financial-relief-and-
worker-role-in-management agreement at Eastern Air Lines marked 
the culmination of a four-year effort by I AM District 100 to respond 
effectively to Eastern management and to an abruptly changing 
environment in the airline industry. It was also the beginning of a 
new phase. 
Beset by a hostile management, the devastating effects of airline 
deregulation, a deep recession, and the general anti-union climate 
in the country, the leadership of IAM District 100 felt it had forged 
a way out of a vicious and debilitating cycle. The basic principles 
for this way out—or "model" if you will—included: exhaustive 
research on the actual conditions and operations of the company; 
an aggressive policy of taking the initiative rather than waiting to 
react; an insistence on reciprocal and equitable efforts and sacrifices; 
and the demand for a real augmentation of the decision-making role 
of workers and their union in the operations of the company. 
The Eastern agreement represents the first conceptual 
breakthrough in collective bargaining to occur in many years. It 
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provides a framework for confronting some of the most difficult 
issues facing the labor movement today. It contains the seeds of a 
coherent, expanded definition of the legitimate role of unions in 
today's economy. It pushes back the frontier of management rights 
significantly, and establishes a whole new set of workplace 
practices—which cannot easily be revoked—which enhance the role 
of both the union and the worker. 
One of the key aspects of this agreement is that it was accomplished 
through the existing union structure and through the collective 
bargaining process. It built on the union's strengths and worked to 
shore up its weaknesses. On a broader level, the Eastern agreement 
offers hope that unions will be able not only to make the transition 
in a changing environment, but that they will actually be able to keep 
ahead of those changes and take the initiative in areas where they 
have previously only reacted. 
This model, when applied, allows the union and its members to 
make informed, independent judgements about a host of issues 
previously left either to blindly following a company's line or 
reflexively reacting to company assertions. It recognizes that unions 
must learn much more about an employer and the employer's 
business operations. 
Not to be ignored, this specific agreement saved 37,000 jobs, 
providing Eastern workers with a measure of ownership, dignity and 
authority that they were not previously accorded. 
It is also true that the agreement carries with it additional burdens 
and risks for the IAM membership and leadership. But, as we hope 
to demonstrate, this is a trade-off which was not only unavoidable, 
it is one that offers immense opportunities as well. 
How The Agreement Emerged 
An agreement of the magnitude of the Eastern accord cannot be 
considered outside of the context in which it occurred. This is 
especially true if it is being viewed as a model for others to emulate. 
As was documented in the previous issue of Labor Research 
Review (No. 4, Winter 1984), for several years District 100 conducted 
a broad and aggressive campaign against Eastern's management style 
and techniques. This campaign included a series of financial research 
and training programs, a highly visible and effective use of the media, 
internal communications, and creative actions at the workplace. 
District 100 President Charles Bryan had consistently argued that 
the key problem at Eastern was that the company did not treat its 
workers with any respect or consideration, thus depriving them of 
any possibility of dignity or feelings of security at the job. The almost 
unbroken string of confrontations, strike threats and generally hostile 
workplace relations were bound to create severe difficulties for the 
•kdZ^j&dmsi^iik^MiS®: ^ 
:W The 1AM District 100 "Mode!'^-A Debate 97 
ng some of the most difficult 
day. It contains the seeds of a 
e legitimate role of unions in 
frontier of management rights 
hole new set of workplace 
roked—which enhance the role 
lent is that it was accomplished 
e and through the collective 
lion's strengths and worked to 
r level, the Eastern agreement 
Lot only to make the transition 
ey will actually be able to keep 
initiative in areas where they 
[he union and its members to 
nents about a host of issues 
lowing a company's line or 
ions. It recognizes that unions 
mployer and the employer's 
greement saved 37,000 jobs, 
sure of ownership, dignity and 
sly accorded. 
*ies with it additional burdens 
d leadership. But, as we hope 
ch was not only unavoidable, 
mities as well. 
nt Emerged 
he Eastern accord cannot be 
which it occurred. This is 
model for others to emulate, 
us issue of Labor Research 
I years District 100 conducted 
it Eastern's management style 
1 a series of financial research 
nd effective use of the media, 
2 actions at the workplace, 
had consistently argued that 
ie company did not treat its 
tion, thus depriving them of 
ecurity at the job. The almost 
- threats and generally hostile 
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company, he maintained. Eastern was always focusing on the 
"negatives" and the "gloom and doom," Bryan said, rather than 
developing a "positive and up-beat" problem-solving approach to 
dealing with challenges. 
By September 1983, however, Bryan thought that there would be 
something of a respite from the confrontation syndrome. Earlier in 
the year, the IAM had finally achieved its goal of an "industry 
standard" wage package; it had agreed to a small, interest-bearing 
wage investment program to help the company with cash-flow 
problems; and it was in the process of establishing with the company 
an "employee involvement" program in which the union had secured 
iron-clad protections against management abuses. 
Then, on September 15, 1983, in the midst of the District 100 
Convention, Bryan received a message that Eastern Air Lines 
Chairman Frank Borman had an "urgent" matter to discuss and 
wished to schedule a meeting as soon as possible. At the meeting 
four days later, Borman feverishly argued that Eastern was in severe 
financial straits; all of Eastern's workers would have to take a direct 
20% pay cut, contributions to their pension funds would have to be 
postponed, and hard-won work rules would have to be scrapped. If 
the workforce did not accept this ultimatum by October 13th, Eastern 
would file for protection under the bankruptcy laws. 
If Bryan was stunned, he was doubly incensed. Here was yet 
another example of Eastern's "business as usual," one shrill threat 
after another. It seemed that management was incapable of settling 
down to run an airline and allowing its workers some peace of mind. 
Moreover, Borman's threat was transparently double-edged: October 
13 was the strike deadline for resolution of the long-running contract 
talks with the airline's flight attendants' union, Transportation 
Workers Union Local 553. 
Just five days after the meeting with Borman, Continental Air Lines 
announced its bankruptcy ploy. Subsequently, Eastern made its threat 
public. Borman had made strong threats before, but none had the 
impact that this one had. During the last days of September, 
company-sponsored flight attendants began circulating "no strike" 
petitions and held demonstrations at the TWU Local 553 office. The 
national media went wild with special reports on the "next 
Continental." The workers at Eastern were beginning to believe that 
the company was really crazy enough to do this. A frightened public 
decided not to fly EAL, and bookings took a nose-dive. To many 
workers at Eastern, management's threat of bankruptcy was 
becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In order to demonstrate to the public that it was not merely 
threatening bankruptcy to break the unions, the company brought 
in labor relations consultant and former mediator, IAM official and 
^ 
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Secretary of Labor William Usery. Without even informing the 
unions, Usery announced to the media that he had called in the 
investment banking firm Lazard Freres & Co. to conduct an 
"independent" investigation of Eastern's finances. 
The momentum was in EAL's favor. The press was even speculating 
that the militant Machinists union would have to cave-in. Instead 
the union decided to fight back. The first step would be to make it 
clear that Usery was an Eastern representative, not a mediator, and 
that Lazard Freres was not "independent." The second step would 
be to reverse the momentum by demonstrating to the world that the 
IAM leadership was not going to accept Borman's ultimatum and 
that IAM members were behind their leaders. This would be difficult 
because the fear level at Eastern was at an all-time high. 
The IAM immediately began researching Lazard Freres. The union 
found that Lazard senior partner Felix Rohatyn had served on 
Eastern's board of directors and that Lazard Freres had acted as 
Eastern's investment bankers for years. In fact, Lazard Freres had 
helped design Eastern's first worker concessions program back in 
1976. 
Bryan exposed this to a hungry press corps. No longer would the 
press refer to Usery as a mediator, rather he became "Eastern's labor 
consultant." After the IAM charges hit the press, Lazard immediately 
contacted Bryan, stating that it would perform no analysis unless 
the unions agreed that the firm could be "impartial." 
A meeting with the Lazard team was arranged. At that meeting, 
Bryan demanded that the union be allowed to pair management's 
research team (Lazard) with its own consultants, Locker/Abrecht 
I Associates (a firm that has conducted research exclusively for 
i progressive social causes for the past 12 years). Together, they would 
I, ! perform a "balanced and credible analysis." Moreover, Bryan made 
it clear that it was the union's position that if indeed Eastern was 
in financial straits it was not the fault of its workers but rather the 
responsibility of those who made the decisions on how to operate 
the company. Part of the task of a Lazard-Locker/Abrecht 
investigation would be to scrutinize management's role in bringing 
on the current crisis. 
While this was going on, the company was stirring "let us vote" 
sympathy among some flight attendants and non-contract employees. 
Eastern conducted a "vote" on the concessions among non-union 
clerical workers. To no one's surprise, this vote was overwhelmingly 
it i in favor of Borman's demands. 
I i Now the union had to demonstrate its own credibility to the public 
I I and to Eastern's workforce. This meant it had to show that the 
J j members were behind District 100's interpretation of the current 
T j crisis and willing to stick with their union. It was important for union 
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forming the members to tell the world that the real issue at Eastern was 
:alled in the incompetent management not greedy union workers, 
conduct an On Wednesday, October 5th, with less than 24 hours notice, more 
than 3,000 Eastern Machinists, joined by members of the Flight 
a speculating Attendants and Pilots unions, marched down Miami's busy 36th 
e-in. Instead Street during lunch hour. Their picket signs carried only two 
>e to make it ; messages. On one side they read "I VOTE N O T O CONCESSION 
lediator, and FEVER" and on the other side they said " B O R M A N M U S T G O . " At 
1 step would the head of the picket-line, Bryan pointed to the sea of workers and 
orld that the told the national media: "We just voted." 
imatum and During all this, more meetings with Lazard and Usery took place, 
d be difficult \ In addition, the three unions began meeting together and drew up 
igh. ) conditions for an analysis of Eastern's financial status. These 
s. The union conditions included: 1) Borman must publicly renounce the 
1 served on bankruptcy threat, in order to keep it from becoming a self-fulfilling 
tad acted as prophesy. 2) The company must settle the flight attendants contract, 
i Freres had 3) The investigation would go a lot further than just analyzing 
ram back in Eastern's financial difficulties. The unions insisted that they wanted 
to know what management practices had caused the problems at 
T would the Eastern. The finanical investigation would make no 
stern's labor recommendations and propose no solutions; solutions would be 
mmediately worked out through traditional labor/management negotiations, 
lysis unless Lazard and Locker/Abrecht would work as one team and would have 
total and complete access to all company information. The unions 
lat meeting, would have daily contact with the team, and the final report would 
magement's be jointly agreed upon. There would be no public statements on the 
ker/Abrecht study without the approval of all parties. The unions, for their part, 
lusively for agreed to do whatever was necessary to ensure the continued 
they would viability of the company 
Bryan made At a press conference on October 7, the three unions and Eastern 
Eastern was jointly announced their "agreement to agree" and the Lazard-
t rather the / Locker/Abrecht team began its work. 
r to operate As the results of the Lazard-Locker/Abrecht analysis began to 
ser/Abrecht materialize, the LAM became convinced, ever-so-reluctantly and after 
in bringing as complete an examination as has probably ever been attempted 
by a labor organization, that Eastern was, in fact, on the brink of 
let us vote" bankruptcy. And worse than even the Continental "bankruptcy," the 
employees. particulars in the Eastern situation meant that it was highly unlikely 
non-union that EAL would ever be able to reorganize and fly again. Simply put, 
'vhelmingly if Eastern closed its doors, its assets would be liquidated and 37,000 
workers would be without work. The IAM was acutely aware that 
} the public the problems it faced were largely the fault of Eastern's management 
w that the and of forces much greater than just this one company. Deregulation 
-he current and its accompanying fare wars had fostered a vicious downward 
it for union pressure on labor rates. The economy was behaving erratically under 
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the influence of Reaganomics, resulting in lighter air travel than 
would have been expected. The general anti-union environment (and 
the specific post-PATCO environment in the airlines) had put workers 
on the defensive. And Eastern's banks played a crucial role in 
precipitating the crisis by refusing to grant waivers on loan covenants 
unless the company could project break-even for 1984. 
The IAM negotiators felt they had only two choices: 1) Refuse to 
provide the company any "relief" and almost certainly see 37,000 
jobs destroyed; or, 2) agree to provide the company with relief, but 
minimize the duration and extract major concessions from Eastern 
management. 
While the Lazard-Locker/Abrecht analysis was being conducted, 
the IAM negotiating team began to discuss these issues. They were 
also raised in meetings with the other two unions. In each discussion 
the same central question arose: How do we ensure that anything 
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we grant Eastern is not wasted by an ineffective and self-destructive 
management? The answer to that question was always the same: We 
have to get a broad range of "hooks" into the way the company does 
business in order to protect the "investment" that Eastern workers 
will be making. Increasingly, the conversations turned on examining 
the specifics of such "hooks." 
The IAM team then decided to take the initiative and present its 
own proposals for financial relief, inextricably linked with the 
"hooks" it felt were essential (to be called the "Programs for Positive 
Action"). These proposals included demands for "review and 
approval" of a broad range of corporate decisions and policies 
(business plans, capital expenditures and so forth). In addition, there 
were proposals for the reduction of the number of supervisors (which 
had been increased by Eastern in anticipation of a strike) and for 
the augmentation of the authority of the "leads," a seniority-driven 
group leader position. Even a 
management review committee-
—whereby workers could grieve 
managerial decisions—was 
developed and proposals cover-
ing a number of other key 
workplace and benefit policies 
were drafted. 
On November 10, these pro-
posals were formally presented 
to the company and formed the 
basis for the discussions among 
all parties over the next month. 
They were also substantially 
represented in the final agree-
ment between Eastern and the 
union. 
What The Agreement 
Achieved 
The IAM-Eastern agreement 
contains many unique elements. 
The agreement provides for 25% 
of Eastern's stock (12 million 
shares), plus a "no interest loan" 
preferred stock that is conver-
tible into 3 million shares of 
Eastern common and has a 
"liquidation preference" which 
would return all of the $260 
* 
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million placed into the preferred if Eastern went bankrupt (this is 
not, as Compa and Baicich argue, "worthless"; based on Eastern's 
net worth, all of this money is in fact secured). The union agreed 
to a 5% productivity increase, but informed the company that it 
would show Eastern how that's to be done (and certainly not through 
the gutting of work rules). 
The agreement provides for ongoing and unlimited access to 
information; direct involvement in a range of management 
perogatives; dramatically increased roles for elected union officials, 
from top to bottom; an agreement to reverse a previous policy and 
place a priority on the contracting-in of work; forcing Eastern to 
participate in a financial restructuring to provide additional capital 
and so forth. 
The IAM certainly didn't get everything it demanded or wanted, 
but it got far more than anyone else we are aware of. Further, the 
agreement has in fact altered the internal balance of power in favor 
of the organized workforce at Eastern. 
The Skeptics' Fears Are Misplaced 
A recurring tragedy in history is that, often, those who are most 
active in promoting positive change are unwilling or unable to 
recognize and take advantage of the possibilities for real change when 
they appear. Rather, they focus on the risks, the imperfections, not 
on the potential gains and the opportunities. Instead of being agents 
of change, they become defacto defenders of the status quo. Compa 
and Baicich seem to fit this mold with their fear-laden criticisms of 
the Eastern agreement. 
Many of their financially-based criticisms serve as inadvertent 
object lessons on the urgent need for more financial training for union 
activists and leaders. Correct-sounding rhetoric that doesn't bear any 
relation to reality serves no one, least of all workers whose jobs are 
at stake. 
Of course unions should not meekly accept employer assertions 
of need; they should not allow companies to further worsen the 
internal balance of power between management and workers; and 
unions should not shrink from confronting a company directly, 
militantly and in effective new ways. Unfortunately, inflexible and 
unthinking "fightback" and "no concessions" rhetoric leads, we 
believe, to another form of paralysis which is no more useful to 
workers than is the meek acceptance of concession demands. 
Compa and Baicich have four main objections, not only to viewing 
the Eastern agreement as a model, but to the actual agreement itself. 
They argue: 
1) The agreement is too expensive; the stock ownership plan is 
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2) The bargaining situation at Eastern was unique. 
3) The employee involvement and workplace democracy provisions 
of the agreement are exaggerated; there is the appearance of 
power-sharing with no real substance. 
4) The concessions-for-participation trade-off is not a solution to 
labor's crisis; it only diverts attention from the real task at hand. 
Because of space limitations, we can neither fully describe the 
Eastern agreement and its aftermath, nor can we fully respond to 
the assertions of Compa and Baicich. However, we feel compelled 
to answer some of their more serious charges and distortions. 
1. Compa and Baicich claim the agreement is too expensive; 
the stock ownership plan is unsound. 
The central objective for the LAM during negotiations was to 
minimize the risk of losing money while maximizing the workers' 
chances of recouping their investment in the company. In this sense 
the Eastern agreement clearly shows that labor has broken new 
ground. John Peterpaul, IAM Transportation Vice President and a 
key player in the negotiations, termed this as "upside and downside 
bargaining." In other words, if by chance the company made a 
miracle recovery (Chrysler comes to mind here) there would be 
provisions that workers would get paid back. On the downside, if 
the company did go into liquidation the workers would recoup their 
money from the sale of Eastern assets. 
While the IAM did not at all welcome it, the union had made a 
clear determination that a specific amount of financial relief would 
be required to keep the company from going over the edge. The 
calculation of how much to grant was completely driven by the size 
of the problem. In fact, the amount of relief that was finally agreed 
upon was definitely at the low end of the Lazard-Locker/Abrecht 
team's range of projections for losses. 
Compa and Baicich argue that workers were given "watered" stock. 
This is an absurd assertion, since the unions negotiated for one 
quarter of the company's stock, however many shares that might 
represent. Eastern issued sufficient shares to provide that percentage 
of ownership, but the only people whose shares were diluted in the 
process were the existing stockholders. One-fourth ownership of a 
company is one-fourth ownership, no matter how many shares that 
means. 
Another issue that requires clarification involves the necessary 
delays in giving workers access to the stock they have purchased. 
The common and preferred stock for IAM members is being placed 
into a trust (completely controlled by the IAM). Why? Because the 
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union arbitrarily decided that it didn't want them to be able to recover 
some of their money for two years? Obviously not! The stock is 
blocked for two years because that is the minimum time required 
under the Internal Revenue Code to ensure that Eastern workers 
don't have to pay taxes in 1984 on money they will not receive during 
that year. The two-year delay was for tax purposes, simply and purely. 
Throughout the negotiation, the IAM insisted that workers receive 
"full value" for their investments and that they be able to have access 
to their securities as soon as possible. 
The issue of potential price depression in Eastern securities as 
workers sell their shares in large numbers is a real one. The IAM 
has attempted to avoid this problem in a number of ways. The trust 
provides for a cap on distributions from the trust, at the discretion 
of the IAM-appointed trustee, if it appears that such a large volume 
of stock will come into the market that it will significantly drive the 
price of the stock down. Obviously, the union would rather not see 
that cap exercised at all, but it also feels that it is important to do 
whatever necessary to protect the value of workers' securities. One 
way of reducing this problem was incorporated into the trust: there 
will be a mechanism for "in trust trading" among Eastern workers 
which may eliminate the need for the cap. Also, the union feels that 
at least some workers will decide to leave their stock in the trust, 
since it will continued to be sheltered from taxes. While this issue 
is clearly a concern to the IAM, distorted criticisms that offer no 
alternatives certainly do not contribute to this debate. 
Equally distorted is Compa's and Baicich's discussion of the 
preferred stock. This security was never presented as a desirable 
investment. In fact, it is just the opposite. The preferred is where 
the relief to the company was really granted. It is an interest-free 
loan, repayable out of 20% of "profits available to common." The 
reason it was designed this way is that, because it is paid off only 
when there is a profit, the company was able to essentially wipe the 
$260 million that "purchased" the preferred off its profit and loss 
statement. This is the part of the agreement that allowed Eastern 
to project a break-even for 1984. The IAM was under no illusions 
that this was a "good investment." It couldn't have been if it was 
to serve its purpose. 
But it is worth something, and much more than Compa and Baicich 
imply. First, assuming Eastern remains in business and begins making 
profits, it will pay a total of $260 million in dividends, however long 
it takes. While dollars may be worth less when they are paid, that 
sum is hardly something to sniff at. The preferred is convertible into 
3 million shares of common at any time. While not equivalent to 
what was paid for it, this is also of monetary value to workers. 
Further, if Eastern were to go bankrupt or liquidate, the full $260 
million would 
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liquidate, the full $260 
million would in fact be repaid (less any dividends already paid). 
One only has to examine Eastern's balance sheets (and its net worth) 
to see that the $260 million would be repaid if the company went 
out of business tomorrow, even after all creditors and other preferred 
stockholders are paid off In essence, this "liquidation preference" 
is a form of insurance for Eastern workers: if their sacrifices prove 
to have been futile, they will at least get much of their wage 
investment back. 
2. Compa and Baicich maintain the bargaining situation at 
Eastern was unique. 
There were obviously many specific elements in the Eastern 
situation. But this is not an argument against viewing the entire 
process the IAM went through as a 
model for other labor organizations. : 
Moreover, many of these unique 
elements are those that Compa and 
Baicich themselves urge other unions 
to emulate (the "real" District 100 
model, as they would have it). 
The "unusual balance of forces" and 
the mutual "downside risks" described 
by Compa and Baicich are not all that 
unique. Assuming a strong labor 
organization, most companies will 
indeed face risks when contemplating 
a total showdown with their 
workforce. The obvious fact is that 
whenever an employer acts to avert a 
strike, or whenever an employer "gives 
in" to a job action, it is doing so 
because the continuation of the 
situation poses unacceptable risks and 
costs. This is the essence of an effective labor organization! And citing 
examples of unsuccessful strikes and weak union positions only 
serves to reinforce the point that the District 100 model should be 
more widespread and emulated. 
3. Compa and Baicich argue the employee-involvement and 
workplace-democracy provisions of the agreement are 
exaggerated; there is the appearance of power-sharing with no 
real substance. 
The critique set forth by Compa and Baicich in this area is 
genuinely disappointing as much for what it omits as for what it 
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includes. Their discussion of this issue was not only hugely 
inadequate, it seems to be almost consciously distorted. First of all, 
their critique only focused on the board of director seats, union 
representatives on the pension fund, and a brief dismissal of some 
elements of the union's right to review and participate in business 
decisions. 
As to the board of directors issue: the IAM has never viewed the 
securing of a board member as the way in which effective power-
sharing is achieved. It may represent an acknowledgement of that 
power-sharing, but it is not the tool for attaining or exercising it. 
While there is a utility, from the union's perspective, in having a 
representative on the board, the IAM views this position very much 
as a back stop to ensure that the real gains under the Programs for 
Positive Action are protected (i.e., that the information being provided 
the IAM is complete). In terms of the negotiations, this issue was 
one of the least important to the union and was not at all a major 
focus of those protracted discussions. 
When discussing the role of a union official on a company board 
of directors, Compa and Baicich completely miss the point. They cite 
a portion of Eastern's proxy statement which says that Charles Bryan, 
and TWU Local 553 President Robert Callahan may have to 
"withdraw from decisions involving labor-related matters" (their 
words) due to "conflicting obligations" (Eastern's language). What 
they failed to note is that the statement actually says that these union 
leaders "may" have to "limit" their role as directors in instances 
"directly" involving labor-related matters. There are two important 
points to be made here, points which were negotiated with the 
company when the proxy statement was drawn up. First, the 
statement does not say that they must withdraw from such 
deliberations, it says they may do so. Secondly, such an action is left 
totally to the determination of the two union leaders themselves. 
There is another aspect of the board-of-directors issue which 
Compa and Baicich missed: unlike other union leaders who have 
been appointed to corporate boards as individuals, Bryan and 
Callahan were appointed as institutional representatives of their labor 
organizations. This is an important point, since it represents an 
explicit acknowledgement of their role on the board (as opposed to 
the sham Chrysler maintained in appointing Douglas Fraser but not 
Owen Bieber). 
It was amazing to read that the agreement providing for two union 
representatives on the Eastern-LAM pension fund was not a sufficient 
gain to qualify as power-sharing. First of all, the two union trustees 
will have a legal fiduciary responsiblity, and as such, will certainly 
have much greater access to information about the investment and 
control of the fund's assets, as well as its benefit policies. We agree 
that workers sho 
find Compa's ai 
disingenuous: thi 
have no control 
one. While there 
do so, we think 
bad faith. 
As was menti< 
elements of the I 
factual correctioi 
1984 Eastern Bus 
of a financial re. 
Although Easte 
the first five mon 
the balance of po 
the relations beft 
than they ever hi 
union interest he 
this is fact. 
What specifics 
Several task fore 
eliminating the c 
brought millions 
in-house and an 
task force has be 
and union leads, 
that the lead rui 
to significantly e 
stewards and c 
supervisors to w< 
the leads are com 
Eastern stations. 
Baicich works, ^ 
thoroughly addr< 
at the station tell 
he says, because 
At the other en 
to information, h 
on all aspects oi 
materials going 
(which is usually 
documentation c 
But the process 
than simply exai 
has insisted on 1 
lL 
:&J&MtafasM&&&a 
:his issue was not only hugely 
consciously distorted. First of all, 
ae board of director seats, union 
md, and a brief dismissal of some 
eview and participate in business 
le: the IAM has never viewed the 
le way in which effective power-
sent an acknowledgement of that 
ool for attaining or exercising it. 
union's perspective, in having a 
UV4 views this position very much 
eal gains under the Programs for 
lat the information being provided 
:
 the negotiations, this issue was 
mion and was not at all a major 
ons. 
uon official on a company board 
npletely miss the point. They cite 
nt which says that Charles Bryan, 
Robert Callahan may have to 
ng labor-related matters" (their 
ons" (Eastern's language). What 
ent actually says that these union 
ir role as directors in instances 
latters. There are two important 
hich were negotiated with the 
tent was drawn up. First, the 
y must withdraw from such 
>. Secondly, such an action is left 
two union leaders themselves, 
board-of-directors issue which 
other union leaders who have 
ds as individuals, Bryan and 
rial representatives of their labor 
t point, since it represents an 
ole on the board (as opposed to 
Dointing Douglas Fraser but not 
cement providing for two union 
ension fund was not a sufficient 
st of all, the two union trustees 
lity, and as such, will certainly 
ition about the investment and 
s its benefit policies. We agree 
im^MMti^, 
The IAM District 100 "Model'^-A Debate 107 
that workers should control their pension funds completely, but we 
find Compa's and Baicich's complaint in this area to be quite 
disingenuous: this is a real step forward by any measure. Most unions 
have no control or representatives at all on funds like the Eastern 
one. While there may be many reasons for a union deciding not to 
do so, we think that criticisms of others who do are effectively in 
bad faith. 
As was mentioned, the Compa/Baicich discussion of the other 
elements of the Eastern agreement is hugely inadequate. By way of 
factual correction, the union did achieve the right of approval of the 
1984 Eastern Business Plan (which includes capital expenditures) and 
of a financial restructuring program. 
Although Eastern management is clearly still management, during 
the first five months of this agreement (early December to early May) 
the balance of power inside the company has unquestionably shifted, 
the relations between the company and the union are quite different 
than they ever have been, and the areas of acknowledged legitimate 
union interest has been dramatically expanded. This is not rhetoric, 
this is fact. 
What specifically are we referring to? Here are a few examples: 
Several task forces are operating with the goal of reducing and/or 
eliminating the contracting-out of work. These groups have already 
brought millions of dollars worth of previously contracted-out work 
in-house and are working on several much larger projects now. A 
task force has been established to redefine the roles of supervisors 
and union leads. The goal of the IAM is to establish the principle 
that the lead runs the show, and the purpose of this task force is 
to significantly expand the role of the lead, as well as of the elected 
stewards and chief stewards. As of this writing, the ratio of 
supervisors to workers has been reduced in a score of locations, and 
the leads are completely controlling the work process at several major 
Eastern stations. Not included in this list is the station at which 
Baicich works, Washington National Airport, which has yet to be 
thoroughly addressed by the task force (although, the chief steward 
at the station tells us that significant strides have been made, largely, 
he says, because of actions taken by Distict 100). 
At the other end of the spectrum, the IAM has had constant access 
to information, in as minute detail and as raw a form as it demands, 
on all aspects of the operation of the company. This includes all 
materials going to the board of directors (obviously), the lenders 
(which is usually much more detailed), and a vast array of detailed 
documentation covering a dozen different areas. 
But the process hasn't stopped there. The IAM has done much more 
than simply examine the information provided by the company. It 
has insisted on being directly involved in discussions concerning 
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major business decisions (to which it now has a contractual right). 
These in-depth and ongoing discussions have included, to date, such 
areas as short and long-term planning, scheduling and pricing, capital 
expenditures, advertising, and financial restructuring. 
In fact, the process has evolved to the point where various Eastern 
executives are now regularly approaching the IAM with new ideas 
about one topic or another. There have already been several instances 
where IAM opinions on or opposition to a particular decision have 
caused company executives to go back to the drawing boards or to 
alter a proposal before it even reached the board of directors. 
The IAM is fully aware that this is a double-edged sword; that there 
are very real possibilities of being "set up." But the union is 
convinced, first of all, that it has no choice but to become involved 
in order to adequately represent its membership, and, secondly, it 
is preferable to have the deepest understanding possible of the 
company's strategies and operations. 
To illustrate this whole process of bargaining for "hooks," lets us 
describe one of the minor bargaining issues during the fall 
negotiations. We say "minor" only because the issue was easily and 
swiftly resolved to the IAM's satisfaction without much controversy. 
Anyone familiar with modern union-busting methods knows that 
the focal point of these methods is to produce fear among the 
workers. Industrial psychologists and communications experts design 
a barrage of surveys, "fact" sheets, letters, video tapes and speeches. 
During the IAM's four-year struggle with Eastern, these tools of the 
union-busting trade were constantly being used against the 
workforce. 
During the investigation of Eastern's books, the IAM research team 
discovered that Eastern had hired one of the most notorious union-
busting consultants. Because of this discovery, the IAM now has prior 
review of all company communications to employees and review of 
the company's hiring of consultants. We all know oi many trade 
unionists who would give their eye teeth for this type of 
"participation" in the workplace. 
During the first five months of this agreement the IAM raised 
strong objections to several of Eastern's pieces of communication. 
Because of these objections the communications were either 
withdrawn or revised. 
4. The concessions for participation trade-off is not a solution 
to labor's crisis; it only diverts attention from the real task at 
hand. 
Compa and Baicich imply that the IAM somehow sought a 
"concessions for participation trade-off." While District 100 obviously 
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believes that the participation elements are crucial, they were 
demanded only after it became clear that something had to be done. 
The point is that they formed a part of the IAM's strategy to actually 
solve the problem. 
While the size of the relief package was determined by the process 
mentioned previously, the IAM would almost certainly nor have 
entered into any agreement without the "trade-offs." They were 
convinced that many of the problems facing the company were 
internally generated (the disastrous impact on revenues stemming 
from Borman's sabre-rattling, vindictive and hostile attitudes towards 
workers and their organizations, inept and confused management 
structures, styles and policies). The IAM position was that, if Eastern 
continued to be run as it had been in the past, no amount of financial 
relief would cure the problem. Workers would just be pouring their 
wages down a rat-hole in all aspects of the operation of the company. 
The union argued that the company could be healthy and pay its 
workers a decent wage, but this would only happen if the union were 
able to make the company operate better than it had in the past. 
Collective bargaining is an evolutionary process, and it is diffcult 
to say exactly how much authority (or management rights) a company 
will be willing to give up at any particular point in time. Clearly, 
there have been quantitative leaps in the past, and we believe this 
to be another major advance. As we have acknowledged, Eastern 
management is still management, but it is misleading to argue that 
the IAM's agreement has no value simply by saying that it leaves 
"real control firmly in management hands." As we have shown, the 
balance of power has in fact shifted. Moreover, it is ludicrous to argue 
against such an agreement on the grounds that the union did not 
gain complete control of the company. Where has that ever been 
achieved? How would one go about that? Do Compa and Baicich 
really want unions to negotiate such a deal? 
It is not "utopian" or "diversionary" for a union to respond 
aggressively and creatively to a company, demanding that the 
company accept responsibility for many of the problems it faces and 
agree to cede some authority to the people who must bear the brunt 
of the company's mistakes. 
There is no question that deregulation, union-busting and the abuse 
of bankruptcy laws are major problems, and arguably at the core 
of the troubles at Eastern Air Lines. But would Compa and Baicich 
have Eastern employees be the sacrificial lambs to dramatically make 
this point? On a number of occasions, Bryan has indicated his 
frustration at dealing with a situation that is larger than one company. 
"The problem with confronting the deregulation issue directly," he 
says, "was that when there might have been a chance to do something 
about it (in late September and early October, when both Eastern 
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and Continental were hot news), I had a choice of either working 
to save 37,000 jobs or demonstrate how destructive deregulation 
really is. I just didn't think that I had the right to ignore what would 
happen to the people I represent, as well as to other Eastern 
employees, while I fought the battle of deregulation." Would Compa 
or Baicich argue differently? 
The point is that the "sacrificial lamb" approach is not only 
devastating to workers, it can accomplish the opposite of what's 
intended. Instead of encouraging other workers to stand up to 
employer demands for concessions, the "sacrificial lamb" approach 
only puts another club in the unionbuster's arsenal of fear. Every 
worker in the country would love to have a dollar for every time 
the boss has pointed his finger at the fired air traffic controllers or 
the laid-off Braniff workers and said "if you don't behave, that's what 
is going to happen to you." On the other hand, not one airline has 
asked for the Eastern package during current negotiations in the 
industry. On the contrary, other airlines are vigorously fighting IAM 
demands which are similar to the Eastern accords. 
One senses from Compa and Baicich a deeper hostility to union 
involvement in worker participation and problem-solving programs, 
a hostility which seems to be profoundly conservative and at odds 
with any understanding of the historic development of work 
relations. 
One of the most interesting elements of the Eastern agreement is 
that it provides a wealth of ideas about how to get out of the killing 
dilemma of how to respond to a range of new management initiatives 
and techniques. Just as unions adapted to scientific management in 
the midst of unparalleled growth, they must develop ways to respond 
to the techniques of "decentralization' and "participative 
management" in an era of uneven but often rapid change, economic 
stagnation and industry upheaval. No one liked time-and-motion 
studies, but unions had to learn to deal with them effectively in their 
collective bargaining demands. This process formed the basis of most 
contracts in existence today. It is a simple fact that, increasingly, the 
new management techniques do not follow this mode, and that new 
responses must be developed by unions if they are to effectively 
represent their members (not to mention organize new ones.) 
The real test of any change in the ways that unions and workers, 
on the one hand, and companies, on the other, interact is whether 
it strengthens or weakens the union; whether it makes workers' jobs 
easier or more difficult, more fulfilling or more mundane. It is absurd 
to argue that all forms of change in company-union delations are bad, 
or that joint committees, problem-solving, less rigid work 
environments are, per se, destructive of workers' rights and 
inevitably disadvantageous to labor organizations. We believe that 
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Another fear that is raised about these participative, problem-
solving approaches is that they will effectively neutralize contractual 
provisions. There are certainly ongoing, less formal negotiations that 
take place at Eastern during the process of joint committees, problem 
solving and the like. And, there are trade-offs being made (not just 
by leadership, but by chief stewards, stewards and leads) in the 
process of dealing with a particular issue or set of issues. But to date 
the agreements, procedures and policies that have emerged have been 
to the benefit of the workers represented by the IAM and have 
strengthened, not weakened, the union as an organization and as an 
effective force. 
The fact is that the IAM has not abandoned the basics so essential 
to developing and maintaining a strong and effective union. The 
agreement it reached with Eastern was the logical, and applaudable, 
outcome of the "District 100 model" given the situation the union 
confronted. Obviously, a different set of circumstances would have 
resulted in other outcomes. It would appear that the real problem 
that some have with the Eastern agreement is that it represents a 
threatening and potentially far-reaching development for those whose 
static solutions for the labor movement are clearly not producing 
demonstrable gains. 
Why The Eastern Agreement Should Be Viewed As A Model 
The Eastern agreement should not be unthinkingly viewed as a 
model for the labor movement in its particulars. The situation was 
unique in many ways and many of the specifics could not be 
duplicated elsewhere. But it can serve as a model on another level: 
the process through which it unfolded and the principles which it 
establishes are, in our opinion, very much worthy of emulation. Even 
at the level of specific elements of the agreement, many of the 
programs negotiated by District 100 could prove highly suggestive 
for other labor organizations. 
To us, the District 100 Model includes the following elements: 
1. Exhaustive Research on the Actual Condition and 
Operations of a Company. 
This process, which District 100 pioneered, clearly provided it with 
the capacity to evaluate the company's claims and to respond 
creatively. 
2. An Aggressive Policy of Taking the Initiative. 
By taking these initiatives—in the press, in negotiations, at the 
workplace—the union is able to establish the framework for a debate 
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or for a conflict. It is indeed true that such an approach entails risks, 
but not taking the initiative and its attendant risks simply allows so-
meone else to set your risks for you. 
3. An Insistence on Reciprocal and Equitable Efforts and 
Sacrifices. 
The cure to "concession bargaining" is, in our opinion, "reciprocal 
bargaining." An insistence on the balancing of efforts and sacrifices 
can be attempted in almost any situation. It also clarifies many issues 
in the process. 
4. The Demand for a Real Augmentation of Union and Worker 
Decision Making Roles. 
We are convinced that the IAM did in fact achieve a real 
augmentation of union and worker authority at Eastern, and we 
believe that this is a goal which should be shared by all unions. It 
is not only a value unto itself, it is essential if unions are to adequately 
represent their members. 
In sum, the District 100 Model is clearly worthy of emulation. That 
is not to say that there aren't risks or that there will not be serious 
problems in the future. And there will always be a tremendous 
tension between any management and representatives of its 
workforce, and such relationships are always subject to many forces 
which are in constant flux. It is possible that Eastern management 
will revert to its old ways, but, as one IAM official has observed: 
"We've taken our guns and put them in the closet. But they're still 
there, well oiled, and we know how to use them." 
The alternative, however, is far worse. Skeptics would have unions 
paralyzed and fearful. Their gloom-and-doom approach to the very 
real challenges facing workers would only condemn unions to 
perpetual disarray and indecision. 
Compa and Baicich urge unions to follow the "real" District 100 
model and "look for a way out." We agree, and believe that this is 
exactly what the District 100 did at Eastern Air Lines. We hope that 
others will intelligently and flexibly examine the District 100 Model 
for the very real opportunities it can offer them. 
